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Abstract 
 Kelly's concept of Man is that of a scientist formulating 
hypotheses about the world and revising them in the light of their 
predictive utility. His works contain the roots of cognitive approaches 
to therapy but have been challenged by recent reformulations of the 
concept of 'constructs'. His position is one of subjective realism 
which does not account for how collective knowledge of the world is 
possible except through his formulation of the concept of role. 
Establishing knowledge about how others construe the world is made 
possible in clinical situations by recourse to two Kellyan methods: 
the character sketch, and the role construct repertory test. The former 
relies on clinical observation, the latter on statistical 
sophistication. This divergence in methods has led to an ideological 
split in the following Kelly spawned, although this need not be a barrier 
to clinical research in this field.  Although not all cognitive 
therapists are constructivists they share with the latter the desire 
to bring together inductive and deductive assessment methods and stress 
the centrality of the concept of self in any self-regulating therapy. 
However cognitive psychology's modular approach to organization is 
a challenge to Kelly's which conceives of everyday experience solely 
as an intellectual activity, and makes assumptions about the logical 
nature of construing. Despite this, cognitive therapeutic methods not 
committed to a constructivist view can be adapted from it. Its 
dialectical logic can be expanded; its clinical advantage is the quick 
access it provides to personal meaning.  
Construing contexts: Problems and prospects of George Kelly's Personal 
Construct Psychology and its alternatives 
 
 There seems tacit agreement amongst cognitive psychologists of 
various persuasions that the meaning of a person's thoughts are best 
understood within a personal context of relatedness. The way we think, 
on one occasion is related to the way we think on another, whether 
in the past, present or future, and by examining this context a theme 
might be identified which could predict the emergence of similar 
thoughts in the future.  
 One comprehensive account which grants access to idiosyncratic 
contexts is the Personal Construct Psychology (PCP) of George Kelly 
with its attendant methodology, the repertory grid (Kelly, 1955). In 
this he proposed a model of man as an active construer of the universe, 
but, unlike the models of his day which, following Freud, clung to 
concepts derived from a philosophy of the unconscious, or, as with 
Rogers, assumed a moral Man at their centre, Kelly's stressed individual 
development devoid of a moralizing imperative, and a cognitive capacity 
for enhancement and change.  
 Whilst a considerable number of empirical studies have sprung 
from it, based mainly upon the repertory grid test (see for example, 
Adams-Webber, 1979), Kelly's ideas have not been widely adopted by 
cognitive psychologists. A key reason has been that cognitive 
psychology is more concerned with processes of representation which 
he did not address. Also his constructionist philosophy is not 
necessarily the same as that adopted by cognitivists. Despite this 
the grid continues to be adopted and yields interesting clinical results 
(see, for example, Beail, 1985, Winter, 1992)  
 This paper critically reviews the central tenets of Kelly's work 
and those of related theories of personal context, and discusses the 
continuing relevance and applicability of his theory to current debates 
in clinical cognitive psychology. 
 
The major tenets  
 At the heart of his work lie two major axioms: constructive 
alternativism and man-the-scientist. The first, a neologism coined 
by Kelly, proposes the universe as a domain open to continual revision. 
His view of us is as constructivists, and it emphasizes the active, 
interpretive stance we take to the world. It assumes a subjective realism 
by which each of us interprets the world according to our construals 
of its possibilities. Such a view is at the heart of current cognitive 
approaches to faulty inference (see for example, Freeman et al, 1991) 
but Kelly was perhaps more systematic. His stress on interpretation 
for predictive possibility lead him to his second axiomatic assertion, 
that we act in the manner of scientists. We formulate hypotheses, test 
them against reality (that is, against our previous attempts to know 
the world) and revise them if they turn out to be false or have limited 
utility.  
 It will be apparent in this schema that the act of construing 
never delivers "reality" to us directly; we can only form progressive 
approximations to the world based upon our anticipations of it and 
testing these against consequences. We are all motivated to predict 
the future, says Kelly, and make plans based upon expected outcomes, 
but, from our individual vantage points, there may be significant 
differences between us in terms of our judgments. How does this arise? 
 
Constructs  
 According to Kelly (1955) we select dimensions relevant to us 
to organize our impressions of other people, objects and events. This 
lies at the heart of the interpretive process or act of construing 
and leads to the formation of constructs, -- "transparent patterns 
or templates" fitted to the realities of which the world is composed.  
 The construct represents a consistent way for each of us to make 
sense of some aspect of reality in terms of similarities and differences 
between objects and events. It is a discrimination of things as being 
alike and yet different from others, and results in polarized dimensions, 
for example, "intelligent/stupid", "good/bad", "excitable/calm", 
which give order and structure to our perceptions and so provide the 
basis for acting in a planned and purposeful way. Each construct 
represents a pair of rival hypotheses either of which may be applied 
to a new situation which we seek to construe depending upon our attitudes 
and previous experience. By testing our hypotheses and seeing which 
best fits with our expectation of the situation, we can retain them 
temporarily, revise or replace them.  Our experiences are thus shaped 
by whether or not we are able to construe replication in the hypotheses 
we advance.
 Kelly's assertion that discriminations are dichotomous, or 
bipolar, is based upon his belief that all construing has this 
oppositional form. Thus, for example, to describe a person or object 
as "heavy" implies a contrast -- an understanding of its opposite (not 
heavy -- "lightness") necessary to being able to divide up the world 
into objects, people, etc., which are heavy or not heavy. Each construct 
therefore implies its own contrast, even if this is not always apparent.  
 The philosophy of the construing process remained largely 
unexplored in Kelly's own writings. Its philosophical legacy 
nonetheless has its roots in the work of Vico, Kant and Vaihinger, 
(Mahoney, 1988). The notion of binary opposites is the basis of 
dialectical thought first theorized in the philosophy of Kant, 
elaborated and modified by Hegel, and later, by Marx (see for example, 
Warren, 1984). Two contemporary intellectual benefactors of this 
tradition are relevant here. Levi-Strauss (1964, cited in Coward and 
Ellis, 1977) proposed a speculative model of the human brain as a 
processor of conceptual opposites which enabled him to account for 
the origin of dichotomous thought -- a necessary consequence of his 
model of cultures structured in bipolar terms. Levi-Strauss derived 
his model from that first proposed by De Saussure in his 1913 lectures 
on structural linguistics (1978). Predicated upon the idea that 
language comprises fundamental dyads, each made up of a signifier (sound 
image) and a signified (concept), the latter are potentially understood 
only to the extent to which each can be contrasted with others. This 
is because every concept qua "signified" acts as a signifier for another 
concept (the meaning of one thing expressed in terms of something else). 
By this formulation meaning is never given directly; it can only be 
inferred from the attempt by the listener/speaker/reader to hold it 
within a finite number of words (signifieds) of conventional spatial 
and/or temporal duration. From this it follows that the search for 
the meaning of any term can never be exhaustive, as any search through 
a dictionary reveals. Meaning is obtained only at the arbitrary point 
at which the search is discontinued; the meaning of any word is given 
only in terms of others, and each of their meanings in terms of others, 
and so on, the chain of signification being endless. 
 
Concepts vs. constructs  
 The idea that concepts are dichotomous has a long tradition in 
western philosophy of logic which stresses the bipolarity of classes, 
and categories. Accordingly a concept not only defines all objects 
which can be included within it, but by implication, all objects which 
prima facie are excluded. Thus the concept "p" not only entails all 
objects, events, people, situations, etc. designated "p", it also 
entails "non-p" -- a class which includes all non-p objects not entailed 
by p. 
 However while Kelly's term "construct" has sometimes been used 
synonymously with concept, it is understood in his work in two important 
different ways, and in these it diverges from formal logic and set 
theory. In one he aligns it to the word percept which implies a personal 
act of the mind upon the senses entailing a process of construction. 
In the other he speaks of it as a product of human thought which organizes 
itself in ways which may run counter to strictly logical thinking.  
 The implication of this can be shown in the following example. 
The concept "red" implies the concept "not-red". Thus an object which 
is not red is automatically assigned membership of the non-red class. 
Logically black shoes are just as much "non- red" as is a building, 
snow, or whatever. But in making discriminations we do not routinely 
assign to the contrast pole of a construct all objects excluded from 
the construct itself. "Unlike classical logic", says Kelly, "we do 
not lump together the contrasting and the irrelevant" (1955, p.63). 
Just as we have a concept "table", we can point to objects such as 
chairs and say these are "not a table" (the essential contrast to "table"). 
We would not ordinarily point to the sunset and say this is not a table. 
The contrast must be relevant to the construct, and between the two 
poles the range of convenience -- the extent to which objects are 
discriminated along the construct-contrast dimension -- defines the 
construct's utility. The contrast pole will not necessarily correspond 
to a dictionary defined opposite term; for different individuals there 
may be different contrasts and hence differing ranges of convenience. 
The polarisation of judgments into constructs with their often unique 
contrasts does not then imply the logical dichotomy we expect from 
the formal classification of concepts.  
 Distinguishing constructs from concepts and stressing the former 
as products arising from the continuous honing of a perspective, Kelly 
was not much concerned with how the mind functions in the essentialist 
sense. He did write about the 'organizational corollary' whereby 
constructs, in being welded into a framework of forms, organized 
themselves into a functional geography of 'periphery' and 'core,' the 
distinction implying the degree of probability of construct replacement. 
The everyday, trivial, and local form of judgment is often superseded 
as new circumstances arise, but a deeper level of embeddedness exists 
to those dimensions of our thinking which serve us more durably and 
in a variety of circumstances. He was more at pains to talk about how 
constructs are used rather than what they are.  
 The classical philosophical view had it that concepts were 
features of the world in the way that universals could be said to exist. 
And whereas Kelly defined concept as " a property attributable to two 
or more objects which are otherwise distinguished from each other" 
(1966, p.9) he preferred the term construct for its stress upon the 
act of interpretation, upon the use of concepts. As Warren points out, 
when one uses a concept one is not,  
"simply parroting a definition or demonstrating a capacity to see 
resemblances...Rather that person is equally drawing attention to 
those objects that are not included in the concept and which may be 
personally more important, and is investing the concept and its 
'exclusions' with a possibly unique, certainly idiosyncratic meaning" 
(1991, p.528).
 Kelly's preference for construct over concept marks him apart 
from many other cognitive psychologists. However several, like him, 
have been concerned to draw distinctions with classical philosophy's 
definition of concept. Most notably there is Bartlett's 'schemata' 
-- organized models of ourselves (1954); Neisser's cognitive 
psychology with its accent on hierarchical levels of processing (1967); 
and Rosch's 'prototype' -- the abstracted ideal to which objects share 
different degrees of structural or functional similarity (Rosch, 1978). 
Current conceptions of schemata emphasize a network of contemporaneous 
memories activated by association (Bower, 1983). In all of these each 
has stressed the mind's organizational stance to our experience. 
Bartlett's 'schema', formulated when neobehaviourism was at its zenith, 
accounts for how groups of 'impulses' create a context for classes 
of specific response repertoires. Neisser's preattentive processes 
and focal attention deliver up 'images' for conceptual elaboration 
by schemata. Rosch's prototypes enable object classification and 
redefinition by the acknowledgement of 'fuzzy boundaries'. In Beck's 
model, for example, when negative events match earlier experiences 
on which schemata are founded these structures will be reactivated. 
Each of these formulations is concerned to show what we do when we 
ordinarily make distinctions as opposed to acting like logicians.  
 Their contrast with Kelly however lies in their shared implicit 
assumption of 'cognitialism' -- the view that the mind is made up 
of bits of knowledge called ideas or concepts. For this to hold a 
separation and a relationship must exist between knower and known. 
But this view can tell us nothing about what is doing the knowing. 
Neisser acknowledged as much when he said "the cognitive approach 
gives us no way to know what the subject will think next. We cannot 
know this unless we have a detailed understanding of what he is trying 
to do and why" (Neisser, 1967, p.305 cited in Warren, 1991). 
 Kelly was well aware of the difficulties which this view presented 
which is why he rejected so much of the conventional psychology of 
his day that was bound by it, even the term itself: "'Cognitive' is 
a classical term that implies a natural cleavage between psychological 
processes, a cleavage that confirms everything and clarifies nothing; 
lets forget it." (Kelly, 1979, p. 9). His strident objection draws 
a contrast of cognitive processes with those of construing. The latter 
do not adhere to classical logical form, and are as much concerned 
with the conative, and affective sides of our nature as with our 
rationality. Desire and emotion are still assimilated with difficulty 
into the domains of concern of the clinical cognitive psychologist 
(see, Safran and Greenberg, 1991). 
 However, continuing research in cognitive and personal construct 
psychology has lead to doubts about whether concepts are organized 
dichotomously, (Yorke, 1983) indeed as to how they are organized (Rosch, 
1978) and to whether the revealing of submerged contrast poles in 
so-called dichotomous construing is not a choice forced upon subjects 
and unrepresentative of everyday contextual thinking (Gaines and Shaw, 
1981). Nevertheless the concept/construct distinction draws our 
attention to the need to consider the subject's wider frame of reference 
in making discriminations, as well as to focus on the structure -- 
however represented -- of the discriminations themselves.   
 Kelly's fundamental postulate (see table) and his eleven 
corollaries confirm the individual as a construing agent with freedom 
of choice, and extend our understanding of the construing process.  
----------------------Place Table about here 
---------------------- 
 Constructs have a range of convenience, they become hierarchically 
organized, and accommodate to conflicting dimensions within the 
hierarchy. Individuals as construers may have a construct system 
similar to others. They can also construe others in a social context 
by playing a role -- this concept proving particularly important to 
Kelly's system as it is the only place within it where the social 
emerges as a concept of regulation of one's behaviour towards others. 
Without this, Kelly's Man would be an isolated individual, inhabiting 
a solitary world, engaged in construing solely for self-confirmatory 
purposes. There are implications here also for cognitively based 
clinical psychotherapy where a definition of the self is problematic 
and not integrated into clinical theory, except by default. The 
cognitivist, Power, has made the point that the concept of self, and 
how it can be strengthened, is of central importance to all forms 
of therapy (Power, 1989). The increasing role played in therapy by 
such self-referential terms as self-esteem, self-efficacy, and 
self-regulation, has highlighted our lack of knowledge about how this 
"self" is organized (Guidano, 1987). Kelly's definition of role offers 
a potential solution. 
 
Kelly's concept of role  
 With the sociality corollary comes Kelly's idiosyncratic  
definition of role: "to the extent that a person construes the 
construction process of another, he may play a role in a social process 
involving the other person" (Kelly, 1955, p.95). Role is a 
"psychological process based upon the role player's construction of 
aspects of the construction systems of those with whom he attempts 
to join in social enterprise" (p.97). The definition emphasizes the 
importance of the individual's outlook over that of others with whom 
s/he is engaged. As Kelly says, the man who is in a role relation 
"plays out his part in the light of his understanding of the attitudes 
of his associates, even though his understanding may be minimal, 
fragmentary, or misguided" (p.98). The definition also stresses the 
need for the individual to construe others construing of him or her, 
i.e. to anticipate others views in order to comply with their demands. 
Role playing by this model, is thus social, even though individually 
activated, because construing requires the testing of constructs 
against the consequences of others reactions to the construer. Yet 
it is not clear how agreement can be reached between us, nor how the 
social world, once established can claim to effect individual 
perceptual change. 
 Sociologists talk of roles as pre-existing individuals who assume 
them according to circumstance, in line with the general view that 
the social pre-exists and overarches all individual development. 
Social constructionists are also of this view and have theorised the 
interplay between the individual and the social in the development 
of the self in terms first advanced by Vygotsky (see, for example, 
Harre et al, 1985)  and have contrasted these with the egocentricity 
of Piaget's scheme. In sum this view has it that all life is social 
life and, only by taking up positions in the social sphere do individuals 
learn their own sense of identity and individuality, both of which 
are intimately bound up with acquiring and understanding language 
(Mulhauser and Harre, 1990, Sarbin, 1986). While these theorists have 
not specified details of how the social function of language comes 
to shape individual experience they have looked appreciatively to 
Kelly for ways of empirically and systematically exploring the 
question (Harre et al, 1985).  
 Kelly offers a psychological model of how role gets taken up and 
of how it shapes the individual's perception of his or her relation 
to the group, taking on the assumed constructs of others by definition. 
This position assumes a fully fledged language user, or at least one 
capable of making meaningful discriminations. However the 
possibilities of operating according to the sociality corollary have 
not been elucidated to any extent and require further investigation 
within his framework (see in particular, Duck, 1983, pp.50-51).  
The relevance of personal constructs to psychological evaluation  
 A key factor is current clinical debates is adequately accounting 
for the context of meaning. If a commonality of intent underscores 
a continuity between otherwise diverse forms of therapy there still 
remains a fundamental question to be answered. Granting the importance 
of personal meaning to our psychological understanding, how do we 
access it? 
 The most commonly used approach is verbal self-report. However 
self-report scales of the form "tell me how you feel" or "what are 
you thinking at the moment", make various assumptions about 
subjectivity. Firstly, that a person possesses a conscious critical 
faculty capable of commenting on itself, and secondly, that a uniform 
process of "insight" is at work when the person completes a form. 
 But a report of oneself is an act, and like any act it is contextual. 
We may respond to questions very differently according to context, 
and we may differ amongst ourselves in terms of our motivation to 
respond. Accessing subjectivity through self-report is problematic 
since any answer is context specific, dependent upon comprehension, 
motivation and the anticipated consequence of the question. As Nesbitt 
and Wilson (1977) point out, people often tell more than they know, 
partly because self-report also demands compliance over and above 
"honest" insight. In terms of its style and content, a person's 
spontaneous self-report may be part of the person's problem rather 
than a commentary on it. "Talking aloud" techniques and content 
analysis of personal accounts are methods which attempt to capture 
the background stream of consciousness from which the report emerges 
(e.g. Oxman et al., 1988) as are analyses of everyday conversation 
with their implications for psychology (e.g. Potter and Edwards 1993). 
 In seeking self-report reliability a major problem is that it 
can have little consistency over occasions. Recall of data is often 
influenced by the respondents' beliefs in their own or desired traits, 
and the causes of their actions. Retrieval is related to saliency 
and recency effects. Memory error can result from low intelligence, 
"telescoping", "tunnelling", or social desirability. Error can also 
result from response distortion brought on by a therapist's constructs 
not being shared by the subject. An assessor's definition of a construct 
need not agree with the construer's definition (Baker and Brandon, 
1990). In short, respondent characteristics, task demand variables, 
motivation and cognitive processes all influence self-report accuracy 
(Babor, Brown and Del Boca, 1990). 
 Mahoney (1988) has suggested that there are several levels to 
subjectivity, and that one must move from the level of the problem 
(current episodes of dysfunction) through the level of the pattern 
(recurrent regularities in problems) to the level of the process. 
This last level contains ongoing anticipatory constructions that 
contribute to the cognitions which perpetuate the problem pattern. 
The question now becomes how do we give an account of conscious 
experience whilst acknowledging the constructiveness inherent in 
verbal descriptions? Kelly's formulation of role and his elaboration 
of procedures for how it might be assessed, offers a potential solution. 
 
Assessment methods                
 In his original work Kelly offers two alternatives either of which 
the clinician might use. As a clinical psychologist himself, he aimed 
to elaborate psychological problems as distortions of perception. 
To realize this he recommended using the character sketch in which 
the client is instructed to write about him or herself in the third 
person as if writing about a character in a play. This ploy offers 
only a thin disguise of the first person account but greatly improves 
the client's ability to write. In this respect clinicians will 
appreciate its divergence from the commonly used autobiographical 
techniques of cognitive therapy. In effect it increases the chances 
of uncovering constructs which might otherwise lie dormant, and it 
relates dimensions of thought to specific aspects of the client's 
life which can be graphed fairly precisely, either for research 
purposes or to provide clinical insight. 
 Originally such self-characterizations were thought not to be 
amenable to systematic quantitative analyses. But recently there have 
been several attempts to provide these (e.g. Jackson and Bannister, 
1985; Jackson, 1990; Feixas and Villegas, 1991). These are 
sophisticated and follow procedures enacted in the analysis of data 
obtained from the alternative method which Kelly proposed: the role 
construct repertory test. 
 In its initial form elements, the name given to the entries at 
the top of the columns and defined by role titles of significant people 
known to the client, were rated on a set of constructs occupying the 
rows. The resulting matrix was then assessed by rigorous yet simple 
statistical procedures to distil relations not only between elements, 
and between constructs, but between the two sets of variables as well. 
The constructs were elicited by a triadic sorting procedure in which 
the subject was presented with three elements and asked in what way 
are two of them alike (recording the answer as the construct) and 
pointing to the third and asking "how is this different?" (the answer 
being recorded as the contrast). The elements comprised "people I 
have known" and while these are of interest to almost everybody, they 
will not tap all parts of a subject's construct system. Several grids 
would be required to do this.  
 The advantage of using a grid is that it discerns relationships 
which may not be apparent in the course of a clinician-client dialogue. 
For example it can show quite easily and simply whether a client is 
using a construct in a similar, dissimilar, or inverted way to another. 
It can also identify which of the elements in the client's repertoire 
of significant others is the most significant, that is the one which 
generates the largest discriminations among the constructs. 
 The grid forms a permanent record of an assessment at a particular 
moment in the life of the client which can then be read back for further 
dialogue and the possibility of effecting change. It can also be used 
to identify any idiosyncratic construing by determining the strength 
of relationship between any one construct and others using 
correlational analysis (Fransella and Bannister, 1977). With 
supplementary techniques such as laddering (Hinkle 1965), it is 
possible to establish hierarchical relations between constructs as 
predicted by the organizational corollary. Used in these ways the 
test is an instrument, highly sensitive to the individual's account 
of his relations with others. Its function is primarily exploratory, 
rather than as a test of formal hypotheses. As Slater says, "instead 
of excluding variation as far as possible from all sources except 
postulated ones, it extends the scope of the appearance of unexpected 
phenomena in all directions" (1977, p.25). Given its emphasis upon 
the individual and the personal, it helps to have a "self" element, 
and often different self elements such as "myself as I am" and "myself 
as I would like to be". 
 As a general procedure the grid did not originate with Kelly. 
It had precedents in the work of two other psychologists who were 
his contemporaries: Stephenson's Q-sort technique and Osgood's 
semantic differential (Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1971, Stephenson, 
1953). The purposes for which these tests were developed were to give 
highly psychometrical perspectives of perception, and to absorb the 
individual "account" into that of the group. Stephensen's work, 
according to Slater (1977), was developed to test the stability of 
character traits across a range of assessment instruments and/or 
testing contexts using subjects as dependent variables; Osgood's to 
tap fundamental dimensions of thought on large and small populations. 
Both methods rely heavily upon sophisticated statistical tests such 
as factor analysis and both invariably work with bipolar adjectives 
and single statements none of which are usually elicited from the 
subject; rather they are supplied, ready made -- construals of the 
experimenter for further construing by the subject.  
 In spite of their differences these approaches have sufficient 
in common to enable a common grid technique to be discerned, not tied 
to a specific theory (Chetwynd, 1970) although it would be wrong to 
imply from this that grids are not bound by any theory, since the 
choice of technique, the inclusion or exclusion of certain elements, 
constructs, scales or statements is guided by some theoretical 
assumptions even if these are not always apparent to the researcher. 
Repertory grids best exemplify the fundamental postulate and the 
construction corollary ("a person anticipates events by construing 
their replications") but, as Bell (1988) has shown, the traditional 
methods of analyzing them do not reveal much about the organizational 
corollary ("each person characteristically evolves for his or her 
convenience in anticipating events, a construction system embracing 
ordinal relationships between constructs"). This requires methods 
which are still in the process of being developed.  
 Data from grids in the form of a matrix of n rows and m columns 
can be subjected to any one of a number of methods such as factor 
analysis or cluster analysis, but the most widespread method is a 
principal components analysis developed by Slater as a computer 
program specifically for grids, termed INGRID (1972). Non-parametric 
factoring methods have also been employed particularly for grouping 
construct subsystems. This can be done by hand and involves totaling 
agreement and disagreements between constructs about a particular 
element (Coshall, 1991). These methods avoid the statistical problems 
of parametric factoring. 
 There has been considerable debate and examination of these 
methods (see for example Bell, 1988; Fransella and Bannister, 1977; 
Rathod, 1981; Slater, 1977) with two broad views emerging. One is 
that overly sophisticated analyses of grids mask the psychological 
richness that lies within them, and shift the focus of attention from 
the individual from whom the original constructs were elicited to 
a consensus or group of which the individual is a member. At the same 
time these analyses are often the result of abstractions from data 
for which there is no immediate link to Kellyan theory. The contrasting 
view has it that grids have a life of their own and need not be constrained 
by Kellyan theory to mine hidden psychological ore which may lie in 
the manifest data of the completed grid. This split runs through the 
following that Kelly has inspired and is most visible in the works 
of Bannister and Slater who, judging by their mid seventies texts, 
would appear to sit in opposing camps. Bannister, the clinician, 
favoured simple grid methods which facilitated clinical analysis in 
the immediate context of the clinical interview. Slater, a 
sophisticated psychometrician, was keen to extend the limits of grid 
analysis to what could be uncovered. There is value in both approaches 
and the purpose for which any enquiry is being conducted should be 
the ultimate determinant of the methods and viewpoints proposed. 
 A similar tension runs through questions as to the grid's 
reliability and validity. As the grid is particularly sensitive to 
change, how stable is it as a measuring device? Since reliability, 
from a Kellyan perspective, is a measure of the stability of construing, 
it has been demonstrated that the grid is a highly reliable instrument 
-- subjects giving the same construals of the same events when tested 
on two occasions separated by a short time interval (see Bannister 
and Mair, 1968 for a full account). However, testing over long intervals, 
or giving subjects an opportunity to revise their construing using 
different elements, reveals that some constructs are more subject 
to change, others less so (those cohering around the core). This is 
exactly in keeping with what Kellyan theory would predict even if 
the outcome leads to a lowering of conventional indices of reliability. 
From this perspective, a highly reliable instrument would be one 
insensitive to change. While this might not satisfy the conventional 
objection that we have not demonstrated whether the change in the 
construct system is systematic, intentional, or random, a further 
test, suggested Bannister and Mair (1968), can be carried out, of 
correlating the constructs with each other on the two occasions. If 
the change is systematic or intentional the correlations among 
constructs should remain unchanged i.e. the construct system remains 
stable, even if individual constructs change. 
 With validity, we see the obverse of the reliability coin. 
Validation, from a Kellyan vantage point is the verification of a 
prediction or a construal. In order to make a new prediction one must 
advance a fresh hypothesis by implementing a new construct or revising 
an old one, thus temporarily risking the instrument's (and the 
individual's) reliability. Validity would be confirmed by matching 
the revised construct to the subject's subsequent perception and 
behaviour, or by seeing whether the therapist's interpretation of 
a client's constructs squared with the client's own assessment of 
the situation.  
 
Practical consequences of grids 
 While Personal construct theory guides the clinician's probing 
of the client's discourse at the moment of its generation, the repertory 
grid provides an account of significant features of this universe, 
a posteriori. This divergence between the spontaneous account and 
the need to quantify it places some limits on the descriptions offered 
by the client but this should not be seen as unnecessarily restrictive. 
Even in open conversation, sentences express a speaker's ideas often 
in shorthand form. Several points can be condensed within a single 
phrase which can seem obscure; alternatively an excess of words may 
carry only a single idea. The art of the clinician (as with any listener) 
is to tease out the ideas the client (speaker) expresses in terms 
of singular dimensions of construct-contrast form so as to confirm 
the client's meaning by feeding back this understanding to the client 
and obtaining clarification by confirmation or amendment. In this 
the grid resembles other humanist oriented methods which seek to 
discover the structure of a client's viewpoint. For example, in Rice 
and Greenberg's (1984) process paradigm one looks intensively at a 
series of examples of a particular episode and tries to isolate the 
essential patterns that form its structure; in Giorgi's (1985) 
phenomenological method verbal narratives are categorized into units 
of meaning which are verified by the client so that an individualized 
context may be uncovered in which to interpret the significance of 
isolated statements. Kelly's individuality corollary is a reminder 
that one should not treat too lightly the words of another, nor assume 
that just because two people speak a "common language" their shared 
words mean the same things for each of them. 
 A grid requires dimensions of thought be treated separately. Thus 
a speaker who says "I like the weather when its cold and wet" is 
expressing at least two ideas about the environment in "coldness" 
and "wetness" which need to be isolated if their meanings, in the 
context of the speaker's milieu, are to be made clear, i.e. what 
contrasts is the speaker drawing by his or her use of "cold" and "wet". 
The answers reveal how terms are being used, and what is implicitly 
important to the speaker. 
 Grids can function as exploratory tools or as aids to therapy, 
and can be combined with psychotherapy and with behavioural 
rehabilitation programs. The choice of elements is dictated by the 
nature of the problem. For example if its an interpersonal one then 
the elements should be people; if situational, environments -- work, 
home, rehabilitation, etc. -- should be the focus.
 Any use of the grid raises the important question of whether 
constructs should be elicited or supplied. Supplying them means 
providing a label upon which a client will place his or her own 
understanding. Often constructs are supplied, as they are in virtually 
all forms of psychological assessment using scales and questionnaires, 
the researcher's nomothetic impulse for inter-subjective comparisons 
holding sway over the clinician's desire for a deeper understanding 
of the individual subject. But how does this move tally with Kelly's 
injunction that we are each an idiosyncratic construer and therefore 
should respect others preferred use of words? The practical solution 
is to ensure that the supplied constructs come from a pool of terms 
used by representative members of the group from which the client 
is drawn. If this is not possible, or if, as is the usual case, the 
clinician wishes to know what the client thinks of particular events 
or people, without prompting i.e. putting words in his or her mouth, 
then eliciting is the preferred method. 
 The range and utility of elicited constructs depends to some extent 
upon clients being articulate, and for those who lack confidence in 
self-expression, the importance of good rapport cannot be overstressed. 
By paraphrasing what the client says (i.e. expressing in his or her 
own constructs what the construer has provided) the clinician creates 
an opportunity for clarification, qualification, and amendment in 
a mutually orienting mode of data gathering (Viney, 1988). There are 
pitfalls with this technique however which should be avoided. The 
clinician must ensure that the client understands the meaning of the 
elements and, if supplied, the constructs. From the beginning 
construing too concretely, where emphasis is placed on physical 
characteristics, should be discouraged. Similarly, circular or vague 
constructs will limit the understanding of both parties when these 
are examined after later analysis. The grid obviously works better 
with clients who are articulate, but if a client suffers from a speech 
defect potential problems can be circumvented by using communication 
boards, and conducting the interview over several sessions if he or 
she tends to tire quickly. Sometimes in sorting elements a client 
may not be able to say why things are similar or different. Here a 
form of preverbal construing is taking place in which the subject 
intuitively draws a distinction but cannot say why two or more things 
are different. However the struggle to find the words at the time 
of the discrimination can be circumvented by having the subject note 
the separation of elements and describe it later. Clearly the best 
results will be obtained by a clinician sensitive to personal 
encounters who will be equally adept at drawing out the reticent client 
and curbing the voluble one. In all cases what counts most for the 
repertory grid as a preferred clinical instrument is its sensitivity 
to change.  
 As a tool in psychotherapy the grid enables a person to articulate 
his or her construct system to a greater degree, and thereby subject 
it to more crucial and clear-cut tests, so that its validity, as a 
monitoring device for life experiences, can be assessed, by both client 
and psychotherapist (Bannister and Mair, 1968). The discrepancy 
between the person's report (on face inspection) of his or her/her 
construct relationships and the statistical relationships which 
manifest themselves when s/he uses the constructs in a grid format, 
could be looked on as an index of how well acquainted s/he is with 
the network of implications which constitute this construct system.  
 The clinician however should be aware of potential problems with 
grids. They are time consuming, the average grid interview with 
elicitation of constructs and rating of elements takes at least an 
hour, often two. One needs patience particularly with less articulate 
clients. One also need a basic conceptual understanding of statistics 
to interpret the data emerging from the ready-made efficient grid 
data analysis packages. For example, with principal components 
analysis on INGRID the first component is thought to relate to the 
way the subject fundamentally understands (perceives) the world. How 
s/he does is given by constructs which load on this component. The 
number of constructs which do this and uncovering what they have in 
common requires skillful interpretation -- there are no hard and fast 
rules (see for example, chapter 9 of Slater, 1977 vol. 2). In effect 
it requires a further construal by the clinician of the clients' 
constructs. Whether the clinician is "right" in his or her estimations 
can only be verified by going back to the clients with the grid results 
and offering an analytic interpretation of them. 
 If grids are to be clinically relevant their content form an 
integral part of the therapeutic process itself. This point, made 
by Kelly and echoed by Phillips (1989) cannot be overstressed. Relying 
on technical measures of the grid is not a sure way of understanding 
the characteristics of construing, since the same grid organization 
can be interpreted differently at different times.  
 
The broader constructivist clinical picture 
 While traditionally, psychodynamic and behavioral therapies have 
diverged in the importance they accord to the realm of personal 
experience, the growing convergence between cognitive and behavioral 
therapies has put the evaluation of personal meaning back onto the 
clinical agenda. According to Mahoney and Lyddon (1988) there are 
now at least 20 distinguishable cognitive therapies whose outlook 
is constructivist -- the view that individuals actively construe and 
create their personal realities and each has a representational model 
of the world through which it is filtered (Mahoney, 1988). In practice 
constructivism takes various forms, but two examples will serve to 
demonstrate its diversity. Bandura's notion of self-efficacy adopts 
an agency model of experience based on social learning (1982). A 
person's perception of a situation is reciprocally determined by task 
demands and by their confidence in coping. Confidence is often a better 
predictor of coping ability than apparently objective indicators (such 
as the strategy adopted). At the other end of the continuum are the 
motor theorists (e.g. Weimer, 1978) who view all sensory events as 
a product of subtle motor functions gating and creating perceptual 
events. 
 Personal meaning has also been brought to the fore by the 
convergence of phenomenological with deductive methods used in 
psychotherapy. Frank (1987), has underlined the important role of 
subjectivity by stating that all psychotherapies depend on the fact 
that thinking, feeling, and behaviour are guided largely by a person's 
assumptions about reality rather than by any objective properties. 
 In clinical outcome studies dissatisfaction with a lack of concern 
for qualitative differences among clients, and hence the 
identification of crucial personal variables in therapy, has led to 
an increased concern to explore layers of subjectivity. Werbart (1989) 
for example, in a review of the conflict between process and outcome, 
notes the eventual role that qualitative variables such as clients' 
perception of change and their interpretation of the therapeutic 
relation -- variables inaccessible to quantitative methods -- must 
play in clinical decision making. Smail (1972) shares the same concern 
about the role of crucial processes such as empathy. Shoham-Salomon 
(1990) has explored the notion that therapeutic processes do not have 
fixed meanings, and that the personal context of meaning is essential 
to understanding the relation between process and outcome. Like a 
number of clinical authors, he writes that exploring subjectivity 
must be the initial guide to treatment, the aims of which can then 
be formalized in deductive terms (e.g. Altman, 1988). As with other 
cognitive therapies there are strains between the creative inductive 
and deductive parts of Kelly's theory, there is a tendency to 
overrationalize and inhibit the client's process of discovery. On 
the one hand the client creatively construes the world in idiosyncratic 
and not necessarily logical ways, on the other Kelly assumes this 
construing conforms to a statistical logic and is verified by man 
the scientist. 
 However alternative philosophies have accounted for context in 
ways other than by Kellyan constructivism. Most notable would be 
`contextual behaviourism' (Hayes and Hayes, 1988) which attacks the 
literal meaning of the client's speech and aims to place it in a wider 
behavioural context. On the other hand a radical relativist position 
such as phenomenology would challenge any notion of an entity such 
as an element. It would first attempt to categorize constructs by 
claiming that any apparently objective description of an event or 
person was already a construction, thereby challenging the Kellyan 
notion of a division between elements and constructs in the traditional 
grid.  
 In fact Kuiken et al (1989) have applied a dichotomous logic similar 
to Kelly's to analyze phenomenological descriptions. Each of these 
may be represented by an array of dichotomous variables, each variable 
indicating presence or absence of one type of statement. The degree 
of similarity between any two phenomenal descriptions in the set can 
then be assessed by cluster analytic algorithms. This approach to 
discovering context also represents an expanded logic to that of 
Kelly's since essential properties of experience can be revealed by 
considering phenomenal statements not as bipolar dimensions but as 
members of a polythetic class. The dichotomous logic can be expanded 
to give a more sophisticated and less constraining set-theoretic 
approach to discovering meaning, based, for example, on possibilistic 
logic with forms other than bimodal distributions and groupings to 
reveal context (O'Connor, 1992). 
  Other non-constructivist uses of Kelly include systems theorists 
such as Katakis (1990), who argues that if self-regulation is seen 
as the instrument of therapeutic change then a self-referential system 
must form part of it. Such a system would be defined by a 
hierarchically-ordered constellation of inner representations 
composed of dynamic structures or emotion and cognition which relate 
a given living system to its environment. Self referentiality would 
operate at the highest level in the conceptual system as it enables 
evaluation of incoming information and organizes our experience and 
decision making. Katakis himself invokes the Kellyan idea of personal 
constructs as a means of exploring this self-referential system.  
  Another systems theorist, Von Forster (1984), envisages 
constructivism as a kind of cognitive homeostasis in which the nervous 
system is organized to compute a stable reality. This self-defined 
or self-contained reality is then responsible for regulation and 
transformation of the self which must be accessed without stepping 
beyond the personal system itself. 
 The modern accent on individually generated reality as the prime 
focus for understanding and change echoes that of an earlier, highly 
influential school -- psychoanalysis -- and several writers reviewing 
recent constructivist trends in that literature have concluded that 
exploring the experience of the self in construct terms is compatible 
with understanding the stability and functioning of the ego (Soldz, 
1988; Warren, 1989). Warren (1989), for example, sees personal 
construct psychology as the attempt "to provide a grasp of, and insist 
on a centering of this meaning-giving nature of the human person, 
whether that meaning is in terms of normal language metaphor or myth, 
whether it is concrete or abstract, literal or symbolic. This is also 
the focus of psychoanalysis" (p.461).  
 
Concluding remarks  
 Kelly remains a controversial figure on several key conceptual 
issues, notably that our experience is borne solely of a process of 
construing in a manner reminiscent of scientific hypothesis testing 
and that it results in dichotomous categories of thought. His 
elaboration of the role construct repertory grid test provides an 
instrument for the systematic exploration of construct relationships 
-- to each other, and to the world to which they apply. Although there 
are practical problems in administering grids, which the clinician 
should be aware of,  these are not insurmountable. Kelly's basic thesis 
that we create our own worlds resonates with the broader pattern of 
constructivist thought from which have emerged a variety of cognitive 
methods with clinical applications. Nevertheless the grid is probably 
the most systematic of the assessment methods developed from within 
this sphere. It is also quite adaptable to other contextual approaches 
outside of constructivism, and has played a key role in establishing 
that personal meaning cannot be understood outside of a context. Its 
assumptions about the logic of construing are shaky and may be 
superseded by less presumptive and more set-theoretic notions of 
grouping experience. In the meantime Kelly's personal construct 
psychology will continue to have clinical utility for the foreseeable 
future, and provides a challenge to those other cognitively based 
therapies which are grounded in mediational assumptions of naive 
realism. 
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Table 
Kelly's Fundamental Postulate and its Corollaries 
 
Fundamental postulate:A person's processes are psychologically 
channelised by the ways in which s/he anticipates events. 
 
Construction corollary:A person anticipates events by 
construing their replications. 
 
Individuality corollary:Persons differ from each other in their 
constructions of events. 
 
Organization corollary:Each person characteristically evolves 
for his or her convenience in anticipating events, a construction 
system embracing ordinal relationships between constructs. 
 
Dichotomy corollary:A person's construct system is composed of 
a finite number of dichotomous constructs. 
 
Choice corollary:A person chooses for him or herself that 
alternative in a dichotomized construct through which he 
anticipates the greater possibility for extension and definition 
of his system. 
 
Range corollary:A construct is convenient for the anticipation 
of a finite range of events only. 
 
Experience corollary:A person's construction system varies as 
s/he successively construes the replications of events. 
 
Modulation corollary:The variation in a person's construction 
system is limited by the permeability of the constructs within 
whose ranges of convenience the variants lie. 
 
Fragmentation corollary:A person may successively employ a 
variety of construction systems which are inferentially 
incompatible with each other. 
 
Commonality corollary:To the extent that one person employs a 
construction of experience which is similar to that employed 
by another, his psychological processes are similar to those 
of another person. 
 
Sociality corollary:To the extent that one person construes the 
construction processes of another, s/he may play a role in a 
social process involving the other person. 
